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Abstract
In this paper we provide an alternative explanation for why illegal immigration can exhibit substantial
uctuation. We develop a model economy in which migrants make decisions in the face of uncertain border
enforcement and lump-sum transfers from the host country. The uncertainty is extrinsic in nature, a sunspot,
and arises as a result of ambiguity regarding the commodity price of money. Migrants are restricted from
participating in state-contingent insurance markets in the host country, whereas host country natives are
not. Volatility in migration ows stems from two distinct sources: the tension between transfers inducing
migration and enforcement discouraging it and secondly the existence of a sunspot. Finally, we examine the
impact of a change in tax/transfer policies by the government on migration.
JEL: D51, E62, F22
1 Introduction
Researchers have o¤ered competing theories to account for uctuations in illegal immigration. Hanson and
Spilimbergo (1999) and Borger (2009), for example, take the logical rst step, demonstrating that wage
di¤erentials play an important role in accounting for illegal immigrant ows in the U.S.-Mexico case. In
addition, Hanson and McIntosh (2010) study how di¤erences in the relative size of the labor force in the
origin and destination countries a¤ect the volume of unauthorized migration. Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001)
also present evidence that is consistent with political economy motives governing border enforcement. When
industries that rely more heavily on illegal workers experience sectoral shocks, then enforcement wanes.
Hence, conditions in these industries help to account for uctuations in illegal immigration.
Another literature has focused more on existing institutional features that seek to reduce frictions that
hinder unauthorized ows. In Guzman et al. (2008), the authors present a model in which smugglers are a
means for circumventing border enforcement. Guzman et al. (2004) and Taylor (1986) study how migrant
networks and border enforcement a¤ect migration costs and therefore, illegal immigration. Stark and Wang
(2002) and Carrington et al. (1996) focus explicitly on the dynamic e¤ects of networks, developing models in
which migration can intensify even as wage gaps shrink due to cumulative network formation. Finally, more
recent papers have examined issues related to business cycles and their impact on migration. Borger (2009)
focuses on the impact of the business cycle on migration in an empirical model whereas Mandelman and Zlate
(2012) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to understand the interrelationships
between the wider economy, immigration and remittances.
In this paper, we consider the role of extrinsic uncertainty as a means to account for illegal immigrant
ows. The rationale for considering such an approach is grounded in real-world forms of uncertainty that
enter into policy discussions and hence, individual decision making. For example, the programs that consider
granting unauthorized migrants a path to permanent residency, often labelled as amnesty programs, alter
peoples expectations regarding the returns to migration. Consequently, in a general equilibrium framework
we examine how extrinsic price uncertainty (sunspots), via its impact on the values of taxes and thus the
value of host-country government transfers to immigrants, can a¤ect immigration. Our paper follows in the
vein of Guzman et al. (2008) and Guzman et al. (2004) and, to a lesser extent, the theoretical literature
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which focuses on network externalities.1 We specify a two-period overlapping generations model. As such,
our model cannot be readily applied to studying dynamics at business-cyle frequencies such as the paper
by Mandelman and Zlate (2012). Instead, we focus on longer term uctuations.2 The trade-o¤ for focusing
on the longer run is that we are able to examine a richer set of dynamic equilibria. While DSGE models
are limited to exploring the local dynamics around a stable steady state (where both the existence of a
unique steady state and its stability must be assumed), we will develop a model with multiple steady states
and be able to study global dynamics. As we will show, the existence of multiple steady states provides an
explanation for uctuations in migration (independent of sunspots); one of the two chief contributions of
this paper.
Our results show that illegal immigration uctuates for two distinct reasons. First, there is no coor-
dinating mechanism when multiple equilibria exist. Second, there is extrinsic price uncertainty (sunspots)
that arise when either there is a unique equilibrium or when multiple equilibria exist. As with the network
externality literature, we emphasize the role of non-wage factors in accounting for uctuations, but unlike
this literature we emphasize economic variables that impact both the marginal costs and benets of migra-
tion.3 Specically, we focus on the role of government transfers, border enforcement, and human smugglers
as the primary forces a¤ecting migration uctuations. Governments, like in the United States, have used
these policy instruments (border enforcement and restricting transfers to immigrants) to stem rising illegal
immigration in recent years.4 We demonstrate that multiple equilibria can arise as a result of the tensions
existing between enforcement and transfers (as factors discouraging, encouraging migration respectively) and
uctuations can occur as there exists no mechanism for coordinating on equilibria over time. In addition,
we introduce extrinsic uncertainty, sunspots, regarding the real value of nominal taxes and transfers. As a
result of the sunspot, not only do the values of government transfers and taxes vary, but also the resources
1Our paper di¤ers from the network externality literature in that the network literature focuses chiey on explaining increases
to migration, and does not easily lend itself to account for the volatility observed in actual migration patterns  as it cannot
account for falling, or even stable, migration ows.
2For example, amnesties (in most countries) are events which occur infrequently. Hence, our two-period model, where
periods correspond to a generation in the real world, would be better suited to explaining these types of events. See Machado
(2012) and Karlson and Katz (2010) for examples of two-period models which explore the interrelationships between amnesties,
border enforcement and welfare.
3As will become explicit later on, we will make a distinction between wages (where we will assume a constant wage gap) and
all other benets from migrating.
4The Personality Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 is an example of changes in government
transfer programs that may inuence migration ows. Angelucci (2012), Gathmann (2008), and Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak
(2007) are among empirical papers that demonstrate the deterrent impact of border enforcement.
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devoted to border enforcement. Sunspots have been used to study endogenous uctuations in other liter-
atures: most notably in the business cycle uctuations literature.5 Insofar as endogenous uctuations can
explain observed volatility in output, they may also represent a partial explanation for observed volatility in
illegal immigration.
In this economy, a person is born in one of two countries. Since the analysis concerns only one-way
migration, we designate one country the home country (where potential migrants are born) and the other
is called the host country (to which migrants move). In the host-country, nature separates newborns into
either the skilled or unskilled group. Both sets of individuals supply labor, earn wages, pay taxes, and
consume. The nominal value of taxes is known, while the goods value is not  due to uncertainty regarding
the price level.6 In the host country, there is a market for state-contingent securities. We assume limited
participation in the state-contingent security market; that is, only people born in the host country can trade
in the state-contingent security market while home-country people are excluded. Host-country people use the
state-contingent security market to partially insure against price level uncertainty, and hence consumption
volatility. Tax revenues are distributed between two government activities: border enforcement and transfers
to migrant workers.7 Since commodity prices are the only random variable in this economy, the uncertainty
in our model is extrinsic in nature. As has been shown in previous literature, participation can matter for
equilibria allocations under extrinsic uncertainty.8
When born, we have two types of home-country young people. One type are labelled workers and the other
type are labelled smugglers. In addition, each young person is endowed with one unit of time. For workers
born in the home country, their time is allocated to working in the home country, with any remaining
time allocated between crossing the border (evading enforcement) and working in the host country. We
5See, for instance, Azariadas and Guesnerie (1986), Woodford (1987), Farmer and Guo (1994), Farmer and Woodford (1997),
and Benhabib and Kazuo (1998) for examples of model economies in which sunspots are o¤ered as a possible explanation for
the volatility observed in real GDP at business cycle frequencies.
6Our analysis builds on the methods developed in Bhattacharya et al. (1998) and Keister (1998). These papers derive
conditions under which stationary sunspot equilibria are not mere randomizations over certainty equilibria, and thus, sunspots
matter in a material sense. One di¤erence in our model is that there is a natural restriction in which individuals not born
in the host country do not have access to the state-contingent insurance markets available to host-country workers, although
these restricted individuals are still assumed to be born after the state of nature is revealed.
7We will abstract from the fact that taxes are used for a variety of purposes in the real world. Instead we focus on tax
revenue as it relates to its uses regarding illegal immigration (transfers and border enforcement).
8For a more complete discussion of extrinsic uncertainty, see Cass and Shell (1983) and Balasko (1983). Also related, Balasko
and Shell (1986) study an overlapping-generations model in which lump-sum taxes and transfers are present. See Cass and Shell
(1983), Woodford (1986), Cass (1992), Balasko and Shell (1993) for a thorough development of the role of limited participation
on uctuations in stationary sunspot equilibria.
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assume all home-country workers are unskilled. Migrant workers receive wage income and benets from
the host-country transfer program (e.g., education and health services).9 Smugglers are endowed with some
knowledge of border enforcement techniques and allocate their labor time between acquiring additional
information regarding border patrols and arranging for border crossings. Migrants who use the services of
smugglers spend less time crossing the border and more time working in the host country relative to migrants
who do not use smugglers.
Our results are easily summarized as follows. First, we classify two distinct sources of potential volatility
which help explain uctuations in migration that are neither wage driven nor dependent on networks.10
Specically, we derive conditions under which there exist multiple (two), non-sunspot equilibria in this
economy. Multiple equilibria derive from the interplay between transfers received from migrating (migration
benets) and the resulting impact these have on border crossing frictions (migration costs). These frictions,
in turn, depend on the level of border enforcement and the smuggling industry. Thus, by explicitly, and
more realistically, modeling the frictions a¤ecting both marginal costs and benets, we derive combinations
of migrant ows, transfers and enforcement levels at which the utility maximizing migrant is indi¤erent.
However, there is no mechanism for coordinating on a particular equilibria, and over time, nothing prevents
the economy from switching between equilibria, for a given realization of the sunspot. Hence volatility in
migration patterns may result from the interactions between enforcement and transfers. Second, we show
that sunspot equilibria exist in this economy and that they are not mere randomizations over certainty
equilibria. As a result, even when there exists a unique equilibrium, the two states of nature associated with
the sunspot o¤ers another source of volatility to the migration pattern. Third, we consider the e¤ects that
a change in transfer payments (or conversely taxes) would have on equilibrium outcomes. As expected, the
exact impact of policy changes is highly dependent on which equilibrium and which state of nature prevails.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. The basic model is outlined in Section 2. Section
3 denes sunspot equilibria and shows existence of pure sunspot equilibria while Section 4 describes the
equilibrium values for the level of migration and quantity of smugglers services. We obtain the comparative
9Since our focus is on the determinants of migration, we will abstract from (ignore) general transfer programs aimed at host
country natives.
10As mentioned previously, we are not contending that wages and networks provide no explanation for uctuations in migra-
tion. Instead we are focusing on other aspects of the migration decision which can lead to volatility.
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static results in Section 5. Section 6 o¤ers a brief summary and conclusions.
2 The Model
There is an innite number of discrete time periods, with time indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; :::We consider a world
consisting of two countries: a home country, from which individuals may choose to emigrate, and a host
country, to which individuals illegally immigrate. No one born in the host country leaves. At each date
t  0, there is a continuum of agents of measure one born in each country, living for two periods. Each
agent born is endowed with one unit of time when young and nothing when old. There is a single, perishable
consumption good. Each agent values old-age consumption.
We also introduce extrinsic uncertainty (i.e., sunspots) into the model economy. It is assumed that all
taxes and transfers are denominated in nominal units, which for simplicity we will refer to as dollars. The
goods price of these dollars, , is assumed to be sunspot dependent.11 We assume that there are two possible
states of nature: s 2 f; g : Thus the value of a unit of taxes will either be  () or  () depending on
which state occurs. Finally, we assume that the likelihood of state  () occurring is given by the probability
 (1  ) respectively.
2.1 Host Country
Agents born in the host country are distinguished by their skill level. For simplicity, we assume there are
two types of individuals: skilled and unskilled. Let " represent the measure of skilled workers born in the
host country at each date t  0. An individuals skill level is common knowledge and an indication of their
marginal productivity. At each date t  1, the host-country production technology transforms labor into
the consumption good. Each host-country worker is paid their marginal product.
All host-country workers, regardless of skill level, have access to state-contingent markets for trading
securities prior to the realization of the state, s and spot markets for trading goods after the realization of
state s: The former allows all host country workers the ability to (partially) insure themselves against the
uncertainty regarding the future state of nature.
11We follow Shell (1977), Cass and Shell (1983), Bhattacharya et al. (1998), Keister (1998), etc. in having the sunspot
dependent variable be the price of money.
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2.1.1 Skilled Workers Problem
Skilled workers inelastically supply their one unit of labor when young. They earn a xed wage !H .12 In
addition, they also face a lump-sum tax, Ht ; which is denominated in dollars and which, in real terms,
cannot exceed the income earned by the worker.13 Thus, the value of these taxes in state s; is given by
t (s) 
H
t : Individuals also have the opportunity to buy and sell state-contingent claims.
14 Since only old-
age consumption is valued, individuals save their entire wage income net of taxes and any state contingent
securities in the form of a simple storage technology, which yields  units of consumption in period t+ 1 for
every unit of savings at t. Thus we can write the skilled workers problem as
max
cHt+1();c
H
t+1()
U
 
cHt+1 ()

+ (1  )U  cHt+1 ()
subject to


pt ()!
H   pmt () Ht

+ 

pt ()!
H   pmt () Ht

= pt () c
H
t+1 () + p

t () c
H
t+1 ()
where pt is the price of the consumption good and p
m
t is the price of money. The price of the host-country
consumption good is strictly positive while the price of money is nonnegative. It is useful to represent
the host-country individuals resources available for consumption after taxes. We dene the tax-adjusted
endowment, !H ; by
pt (s) !
H = pt (s)!
H   pmt (s) Ht = pt (s)

!H   p
m
t (s)
pt (s)
Ht

where
pmt (s)
pt (s)
= t (s)
12Alternatively, one can interpret this as an endowment economy where some individuals (high-skilled) receive a large en-
dowment while others (low-skilled) receive a smaller endowment.
13Because we are not modelling all uses of tax revenue in the host country, one can interpret the taxes levied as that part of
the tax bill which is used to fund government services associated with illegal immigrants.
14One can think of individuals as issuing IOUs which are contingent upon whether state  or  prevails. We restrict
individuals to having an overall non-negative position with respect to the total value of IOUs issued across the two states of
nature.
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is the goods price of money. The skilled workers problem can be rewritten as
max
cHt+1();c
H
t+1()
U
 
cHt+1 ()

+ (1  )U  cHt+1 () (SHP)
subject to 
pt () !
H + pt () !
H

 = pt () c
H
t+1 () + p

t () c
H
t+1 () :
As written, the individuals budget constraint is properly interpreted as workers having unrestricted access
to the state-contingent claims markets.15
2.1.2 Unskilled Workers Problem
The measure of unskilled host-country workers is 1  ". Unskilled workers inelastically supply their one unit
of labor when young. They earn a xed wage !L. In addition, they also face a lump-sum tax, Lt ; which is
denominated in dollars. Thus, the value of these taxes in state s; is given by t (s) 
L
t : In all other respects,
the unskilled workers problem is derived analogously to the skilled workers and hence is given by
max
cLt+1();c
L
t+1()
U
 
cLt+1 ()

+ (1  )U  cLt+1 () (UHP)
subject to 
pt () !
L + pt () !
L

 = pt () c
L
t+1 () + p

t () c
L
t+1 () :
2.1.3 Government Problem
The host-country government engages in three related activities: collecting taxes, enforcing the border, and
providing basic services to illegal immigrants. Taxes are collected from both skilled and unskilled workers
from the host countries.16 These funds are then used to provide basic services for illegal immigrants and to
fund the desired level of border enforcement, denoted by et. We assume that the level of service provided to
15Bhattacharya et al. (1998), in their appendix, show the equivalence between the above formulation of an individuals budget
constraint and ones where these individuals trade on spot markets and other contingent commodity markets and/or contingent
money markets.
16We are abstracting from modelling all services undertaken by the government. Since our focus is on determinants of illegal
immigration we are only modelling those services provide by government which relate to illegal immigration (and similarly
for taxes). Finally, government, as referenced in this paper, should be interpreted as all levels (federal, state, and local) of
government in the real world.
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illegal immigrants, a; is constant (on a per person basis) over time but that the quantity of services received
in total depends on the fraction of time that immigrants spend getting to and working in the host country,
T () :17 In addition we assume that the government runs a balanced budget. Thus the governments budget
constraint is given by
t (s)

"Ht + (1  ") Lt

= T (t) t (s) a+ et (1)
for s = ; ; where  represents the fraction of home-country individuals who are migrants. The properties of
the transfer-proportion function are described in detail when we discuss the migrants maximization problem.
2.2 Home Country
The home country is characterized by two classes of individuals: migrants and smugglers. Let  be the
measure of home-country agents who are employed in the production sector while 1    is the measure
of home-country agents who are smugglers. Note that both home-country-born workers and smugglers
are restricted from participating in the state-contingent security.18 Smugglers work only in the smuggling
industry while migrants divide their time between home production, crossing the border, and host-country
production. Migrant production in the home country is characterized by a labor only production process.
It is assumed that migrants produce a single, perishable nal good, which is produced and saved in the
migrants rst period of life, and then consumed when old. Finally, all migrant workers are assumed to be
unskilled.
2.2.1 Migrants Problem
Each generation of migrants is endowed with one unit of labor when young and nothing when old. Since only
old-age consumption is valued, this labor is supplied inelastically when young.19 The migrant must decide
what fraction of her labor time, t; to spend working in the home country and what fraction, 1 t; to spend
17The idea is that all illegal immigrants consume some government-provided goods and services. Migrants who are caught
crossing the border are provided basic services at detention centers and are returned home at government expense. Migrants
who successfully cross the border receive services such as education and emergency health care even though they are usually
not eligible for welfare or most other assistance programs. For simplicity, we assume the government provided goods are perfect
substitutes for the consumption good and that they are transformed at a one-for-one rate. Finally, although amount of time
crossing the border and working is denoted by 1  , we have chosen to dene T in terms of  for expositional e¢ ciency.
18One can think of the participation restriction in the following way. In order to participate in the state-contingent market,
the agent needs to supply their host-country passport. We have no mechanism for faking passports in this model economy,
therefore, the participation restriction is a legal restriction.
19The migrants problem is largely the same as in Guzman et al. (2008).
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crossing the border and working in the host country. However, merely deciding to go and work in the host
country does not guarantee that the migrant will be successful in her attempt(s) to cross the border. Thus,
the fraction of time spent emigrating from the home country, 1   , is further divided into two activities;
time spent actually working in the host country M () and time spent crossing the border, 1 M ().20
The amount of time used in crossing the border depends on the level of border enforcement implemented
by the host country, et; and the amount of services, qt; a migrant obtains from smugglers. Thus, the amount
of time spent working in the host country is a fraction of the time allotment not spent working in the home
country; that is, M (qt; et) (1  t), where 0  M (qt; et)  1. Conversely, the time lost crossing the border
is given by [1 M (qt; et)] (1  t). The level of border enforcement, et; is taken as given by the migrant. It
is assumed that if et = 0; then there is no border enforcement and M (qt; 0) = 1 for all qt  0:21 In addition
we assume that 0 > Me >  1: Thus, an increase in the level of enforcement reduces the amount of time
spent working in the host country.
Since crossing the border is time consuming, smugglers exist to reduce the crossing time. At date
t; migrants can purchase a quantity qt of smuggling services, taking the price, pt, as given; where pt is
measured in units of the home-country production good. It is assumed that the greater the quantity of
smuggling services obtained, the less time is used to cross the border, that is, Mq > 0; and that there
are decreasing returns to additional units of smuggling services, Mqq < 0. In addition, it is assumed that
Mq <1 and 0 < M (0; et; )  1:22
Migrants who work in the home country earn a xed wage ! per unit of time spent in home production.23
Any income not spent on smuggling services is saved via a simple storage technology in the home country.
For every unit of output saved at time t; the migrant receives one unit of consumption good at date t + 1:
Migrants who are successful in crossing the border earn a xed wage !L in the host country and save in
the host country via the same storage method as in the home country.24 In addition, the migrant receives
20We dene M to lie inside the unit interval.
21Open borders correspond to perfect labor mobility.
22The latter assumption implies that even without the aid of the smuggler, a migrant will eventually cross the border and
spend some time working in the host country.
23Alternatively, one can think of ! as an endowment which the migrant receives continuously throughout his young period
life. Thus, if the migrant choose to stay in the home country for  fraction of his young life, then she will receive only ! of
the total endowment possible.
24 It is assumed that migrants are low skilled and thus enter that segment of job market paying lower wages, !L: We assume
that this wage is xed and thus think of this as a minimum wage earned by all low skilled workers in the host country.
Alternatively, one can also think of this as an endowment earned by migrants in the host country which will be dependent on
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transfer payments, at, denominated in dollars, from the host country government. The quantity of dollars
received is assumed to be proportional to the quantity of time spent crossing the border and working in the
host country, captured by T (t). We assume that T lies in the unit interval (i.e., T : [0; 1] ! [0; 1]) and
possesses the following properties: T (0)  1, T (1) = 0, T 0 (t) < 0; T 00 (t) < 0.25 Thus the total, goods
value of transfer payments is given by T (t) t (s) at:
Finally, unlike the workers in the host-country, migrants are born after the realization of the sunspot
and are not able to trade on contingent claims market. We additionally assume that migrants spend their
retirement in the host country.
We can formally write the migrants problem as
max
t;qt
U (ct+1 (s)) (MWP)
subject to
ct+1 = !t   ptqt +

!LM (qt; et) [1  t] + T (t) t (s) at
	

and
!t  ptqt
0  t  1
for s 2 f; g.26 First order conditions yield the set of equations
! =

!LM (qt; et)  T 0 (t) att (s)
	
 (2)
pt = !
L (1  t)Mq (qt; et) : (3)
the fraction of time actually spent in the host country.
25Although the time spent crossing the border and working in the host country is given by 1   t; given that t lies in the
unit interval it is immaterial whether we dene T () as a function of t or 1   t: In addition, despite the technical nature
of these assumptions, the intuition behind them is quite reasonable. If T () satises these conditions, then illegal immigrants
obtain most of their transfers (total, goods value of social services) after rst arriving in the host-country and then government
provided services decline with duration of stay (assimilation).
26We require up-front payment for smuggling services, hence the condition !t  ptqt; and rule out the possibility of borrowing
against future earnings or indentured servitude as a means of payment.
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Equation (2) indicates the trade-o¤ associated with migrating; the income (wage) earned per unit of time
in the home country must equal the income earned per unit of time in the host-country (the sum of the
wages in the host country and transfer payments). Equation (3) indicates that the marginal cost of the
smuggling service is equal to the marginal income gain from using smuggling services, where the marginal
gain in time working in the host-country labor market is measured by the product Mq (qt; et) (1  t). We
assume that U (ct+1) satises all the standard conditions necessary for an interior solution; namely U (0) = 0
and U 0 (ct+1) > 0:
2.2.2 Smugglers Problem
Smugglers are restricted to producing smuggling services and may not migrate or work in the home-country
production sector. When young, smugglers are endowed with one unit of labor that they supply inelastically.
As with migrants, smugglers value only old age consumption and are retired when old. Thus they consume
the gross return from investing their savings in the same simple storage technology as migrants. Finally,
there exists an initial old generation of smugglers who possess smuggling capital h0.
A smugglers unit of labor is divided between two activities when young: accumulating smuggling capital
(research and development), ht; and selling border crossings. For a smuggler, these operations are ordered
sequentially; that is, the young smuggler rst accumulates smuggling capital by crossing people, then begins
selling services. We think of smuggling capital as the knowledge of methods and means for circumventing
host-country border enforcement. The smuggler uses the remaining time endowment to arrange border cross-
ings. We let dt represent the fraction of time which smugglers devote to accumulating smuggling capital and
(1  dt) be the fraction of time devoted to arranging crossings.27
When determining the amount of time to devote to accumulating smuggling capital in period t, we
assume that the quantity of smuggling capital (knowledge) previously acquired by all past generations, ht 1;
is available to the current generations of smugglers; that is, there is no depreciation of smuggling capital.
27One can think of the smugglers rst period as divided into two distinct sub-periods. The initial sub-period of his young
life is spent as an apprentice to an old smuggler, who has institutional knowledge about crossing and enforcement. In this
sub-period, the smuggler undertakes the actual process of crossing migrants over the border. While the apprenticeship provides
no income, it provides the required knowledge to make income-generating arrangements for migrant crossings during the second
sub-period.
This is not unlike arrangements smugglers typically have made on the U.S.-Mexico border. In practice, apprentice smugglers
run the migrants across until they have been caught so many times that they risk prosecution if caught again. They then
become coordinators and recruiters charged with getting clients for the new generation of runners. For more information on
how smugglers operate, see Spener (2002).
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We let the function g (dt; ht 1) represent the process by which time devoted to capital accumulation is
transformed into smugglers capital. Thus we have
ht = g (dt; ht 1) (4)
where 0  dt  1: We assume that g (dt; ht 1) has the following properties: gd and gh > 0 and gdd and
ghh < 0. Let g (0; ht 1) = 0; that is, a smuggler must devote some time to actually smuggling people over the
border in order to develop knowledge about e¤ective crossing methods and techniques. Finally, we assume
that for dt > 0; gh (dt; 0) > 1: Thus, taking the time to accumulate smuggler capital pays bigger dividends
when there exists little smuggler capital from previous generations.
The smuggler arranges migration services in a perfectly competitive environment. As such, the represen-
tative smuggler takes the price of smuggling services, pt, as given. In addition, the smuggler also takes as
given the level of enforcement, et; in period t: Finally, it is only the process of arranging for migrant crossings
that generates income. To produce migration services, the smuggler must devote su¢ cient time to capital
accumulation, so that he may overcome the anticipated level of enforcement. Formally, let the quantity of
migration services supplied be given by
Qt = B [ht   et] (1  dt) for ht  et (5)
= 0 otherwise and
where B > 0 is a constant scale factor, ht   et is the e¤ectiveness of the smuggling methods relative to
enforcement methods, and 1  dt is the fraction of time devoted to selling migration services.
We can therefore write the smugglers maximization problem as
max
dt
U
 
cct+1

(CP)
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subject to the constraints
cct+1 = ptB [ht   et] (1  dt) ; and
ht = g (dt; ht 1)
ht  et;
where cc denotes consumption by the smuggler. Given the interior solution guaranteed by the properties of
the utility function, the e¢ ciency condition for the smuggler is
ptB fgd (dt; ht 1) (1  dt)  [g (dt; ht 1)  et]g = 0 (6)
Equation (6) describes the smugglers trade-o¤. The rst term inside the brackets represents the marginal
gain from capital accumulation while the second term inside the brackets represents the marginal cost of
time allocated to capital accumulation  time not spent arranging migration services.
3 Existence of Sunspot Equilibria
Before focusing on existence and general properties of equilibria, it will be useful to establish the existence
of sunspot equilibria. Establishing this result requires only examining equilibrium consumption allocations
for host-country individuals. This is the result of the fact that skilled and unskilled host-country workers
will insure themselves, via trade in contingent-claims markets, prior to the realization of the sunspot and
that, migrants, who enter the host country after the state of nature has been revealed, cannot participate in
these markets and thus will merely consume the proceeds from their work. Thus, the existence of sunspots
(and in particular sunspot equilibria which are not mere randomizations over certainty equilibria) is strictly
a matter of examining the equilibrium allocations of host-country workers.28 Given this, and the fact that
the setup of host-country workers is almost identical to the unrestricted agents in Bhattacharya et al. (1998),
28We are thus following the structure and methods developed in Bhattacharya et al. (1998) and Keister (1998) to verify the
existence of stationary sunspot equilibria. As Bhattacharya et al. (1998) point out, "...equilibrium in this economy reduces to
the determination of equilibrium in a smaller economy with no restrictions on market participation but...in which uncertainty
is intrinsic."
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their results (from section 3.3) are directly applicable to our economy and we omit a formal proof of the
existence and characteristics of sunspots.29
However, the existence of sunspot equilibria has interesting implications regarding the impact of immi-
grants (or any new, younger job entrant) on unskilled (older), native workers. Specically, any detrimental
impact to unskilled workers is not the result of immigrants but rather is the result of choices made by un-
skilled workers in the face of uncertain future tax burdens. Consider the unskilled workers consumption.
When they pay no taxes, it follows immediately that in the absence of a market in which state-contingent
securities are traded, this unskilled worker would simply consume her savings. This implies that access to
a market trading state-contingent securities results in consumption of the unskilled worker varying with the
state of nature.30
Most importantly, this variance of consumption (well-being) does not depend on the usual story in which
low-skilled workers su¤er wage reductions because of the inow of migrant workers. Here the wages for low-
skilled workers are constant. Consequently, the variance stems from the at redistribution scheme (taxes
and transfers) and the ex ante incentive to participate in the market trading state-contingent securities.
In short, unskilled workers pay for the (preferred) redistribution scheme even though their explicit tax
burden is zero. In our setting, the trade-o¤ between ex ante e¢ cient participation and ex post variance is
a by-product of the sunspot, restricted participation, and the monetary redistribution scheme and not the
presence of migrant (new) workers.
4 Migration and Smuggling Equilibria
The uncertainty over the state of nature, and the resulting existence of sunspot equilibria, also a¤ects the
equilibrium levels of migration, smuggling services, and smugglersallocation of time. Although individuals
in the home-country are restricted from participating in contingent claims markets, their decisions regarding
allocation of time and the level of smuggler services to acquire, will di¤er depending on which state of nature,
29Formal proofs of existence and characteristics is available from the authors upon request.
30Bhattacharya et al. (1998) use the term volatility to refer to the range of equilibrium allocations and prices we are referring
to as variation in consumption. Formally,

cLt () ; cLt ()

is a proper subset of <++ and has positive measure because
cLt () 6= cLt (). In contrast,

cLt (st)

is a singleton and therefore is a measure zero set when the low-skilled worker has
access to the market for state-contingent securities.
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s; prevails. We begin by rst discussing some properties of enforcement and smuggling in equilibrium. We
then describe the equilibrium laws of motion governing the system and state conditions under which multiple
equilibria will exists. Finally we end this section by examining the impact of sunspots on the equilibrium
values of migration, smuggler services and smugglerstime allocation decision.
4.1 Enforcement and Smugglers
It will be useful to rst describe the smugglers decision on how to allocate her time, dt; between capital
accumulation and arranging border crossings. The choice of dt depends on the level of enforcement, which
is given by equation (1), and can be written as
et = t (s)

"H + (1  ") L   T (t) a

(7)
for s = ; : As with the taxes paid by host-country workers, we assume that the marginal dollar value of
transfers received by migrants is time invariant  at = a: Thus, we can rewrite this expression as et =
e
 
t; 
H ; L; a; t (s) ; "; 

: The following lemma states selected properties about the level of enforcement.
Lemma 1 a) e > 0; b) e

 > 0; c) e

 > 0; and d) e

a < 0:
These results follow directly from simply di¤erentiating equation (7) and hence a proof is omitted. The
intuition behind these results is straightforward. Parts (a) through (c) state that if transfers decrease
(because migrants spend more time in the home-country), the goods value of dollars increase, or taxes
increase, ceteris paribus, then there will be greater funds available for enforcement. Part (d) says that an
increase in the dollar value of transfers will decrease the funds available for enforcement for a given level of
tax revenue.
From equation (6), one obtains
gd (dt (s) ; ht 1) (1  dt (s))  g (dt (s) ; ht 1) =  et: (8)
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Using equation (8) and the implicit function theorem we can solve for the fraction of time smugglers spend
acquiring smuggling capital, dt = d
  t; H ; L; a; ht 1; t (s) : We derive the e¤ect of changes in several
variables of interest on the time allotted for research activity in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 a) d > 0; b) d

 > 0; c) d

 > 0; d) d

a < 0 and e) for gh > gdh; then d

ht 1 < 0
The results of Lemma 2 follow directly from di¤erentiating equation (8).31 The rst three results (Parts (a)-
(c)) are tantamount to increasing enforcement and part (d) is equivalent to decreasing enforcement and thus
is the converse of the rst three parts. An increase in border enforcement results in the smuggler allocating
greater time to research and development in order to overcome the greater level of enforcement. Finally, an
increase in the amount of prior smuggler capital (Part (e)) will lead to less research and development since
the marginal payo¤ to additional e¤ort is lower. In e¤ect, with an increase in accumulated knowledge the
young smugglers are reaping the rewards from research e¤orts undertaken by previous generations.
We use the results of Lemma 2 to characterize the e¤ect that changes in enforcement on the equilibrium
quantity of smuggling services, q. Using the quantity of smugglers service in equation (5) and combining it
with the results from equation (4, 7, and 8), we obtain
qt =
(1  )B

f[g (dt)  et ] [1  dt ]g : (9)
Applying the implicit function theorem yields qt = q
  t; ht 1; H ; L; a; t (s) ; "; . The properties of q
with respect to key variables are described in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 a) q < 0; b) q

 < 0 c) q

 < 0; d) q

a > 0, and e) q

ht 1 > 0:
The results of Lemma 3 follow directly from di¤erentiating equation (9) and applying the results of Lemma
(2).32 The intuition is as follows. For parts (a)-(c), changes in ; ; and  lead to greater enforcement, which
leads to less smuggling activity, as smugglers devote greater time to learning about these new enforcement
levels and thus less time actually arranging for crossings. Thus, these 3 parts of Lemma 3 are capturing the
e¤ect that a change in border patrol has on the quantity of smuggling services through the e¤ect on the
31This result is analogous to Lemma 1 in Guzman et al. (2008).
32See Guzman et al. (2008), Lemma 2.
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smugglers time allocation. Part (d) is merely the reverse as greater transfers lead to less enforcement and
thus more smuggling activity. For a given level of enforcement, smugglers with a higher level of accumulated
knowledge (smugglers capital)  part (e) will choose to arrange for a greater number of illegal border
crossings.
4.2 Equilibrium Laws of Motion
We can now condense the equilibria of this economy down to two equations (laws of motion). We can rewrite
equation (9) as
qt =
(1  )B

fg (dt ; ht 1)  eg [1  dt ] ; (10)
where the long list of arguments in dt and e

t are omitted for ease of exposition. The second equilibrium
condition comes from the migrants maximization problem and is given by
!

= !LM [qt ; e

t ]  T 0 (t ) t (s) a (11)
The conditions and assumptions necessary to prove existence (and numbers) of steady state equilibria are
relegated to an appendix33 and we merely state the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If there exists a pair
 
2; q2

such that
i) 0  2  1 and 0  q2 and
ii)
q2 >
(1  )B


g
 
dt
 
2

; ht 1
  e  2 1  dt  2
iii) and if both
qmin  (1  )B

[g (dt (min) ; ht 1)  e (min)] [1  dt (min)]
and
qmax  (1  )B

[g (dt (max) ; ht 1)  e (max)] [1  dt (max)]
33The details and appendix are available from the authors upon request.
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then there exists two equilibria: a high-migration, high-smuggler use equilibrium and a low-migration, low-
smuggler use equilibrium.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the two possible situations in which there exist two equilibria. For the remainder
of the paper we focus on these two generic cases with two equilibria. However, the results which follow
below also encompass those situations where a unique equilibria exists. Finally, we will use the following
short-hand notation when referring to the two possible equilibria: the high level of migration and smuggler
service utilization will be referred to as the high-migration equilibria and the low level of migration and
quantity of smuggler services will be referred to as the low-migration equilibria.
One important point of note is that there exists volatility in migration independent of the sunspot in this
model, as evidenced by Figures 1 and 2  which depict multiple equilibria within a given state of nature.
Because there is no selection mechanism for choosing an equilibrium and because the model is static from
the migrants perspective, at any given date t; either equilibria is equally likely to prevail and it is possible
to switch between the two equilibria regularly thus generating volatility.
The source of this volatility is the fact that services obtained by migrants from the government are non-
linear (in fact concave) in the quantity of time spent working in the home country. The net result of this
is that at low levels of migration, migrants are willing to acquire additional smuggler services because the
marginal return to migrating is su¢ ciently high. However, as migration increases, this results in a decrease in
the level of enforcement, as (made clear in equation (7)) enforcement is merely the residual of what is left-over
from taxes after paying for migrant services.34 Thus increased migration lessens the funds available for, and
hence level of, enforcement. At some point, this reduced enforcement will lead to a drop in smuggler services
as they are not needed to overcome the waning enforcement level. Thus the marginal return to migrating is
equal when there is low migration, high enforcement, as when there exists high-migration resulting in lower
levels of enforcement. This existence of multiple equilibria combined with a lack of a coordinating mechanism
implies that it is entirely possible to observe switching (in no particularly structured way) between equilibria,
34By assuming that the quantity of transfers and border enforcement is equal to taxes, we are essentially assuming that there
are limited funds available to illegal immigration related services by the government. In addition, the government prioritizes
using these funds for social services (transfers) over the use for border enforcement. The federal budget spent on Immigration,
Customs and Border Protection in 2010 was less than 0.46% of the federal budget. Thus, the idea that border enforcement is
not a budgetary priority (modeled as the residual of tax receipts) is not unrealistic. This would also be consistent with border
states shouldering a large nancial burden for enforcement with limited budgetary resources. Finally, see Epstein and Weiss
(2011) for an example of a paper which examines government enforcement trade-o¤s under the constraint of a xed budget.
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thus generating a volatile path with respect to migration ows.
4.2.1 Sunspots and Equilibrium Migration
In addition to the volatility possible as a result of multiple equilibria and no coordinating mechanism, the
sunspot nature of the economy adds another layer of potential volatility to the level of illegal immigration.
The impact of sunspots on equilibrium values often depends on induced changes in migration ows relative
to changes in enforcement. As such, we begin this section by detailing when changes in equilibrium values
are denitive or ambiguous and then proceed to explain the sources of any ambiguities. Finally, we examine
the extent to which sunspots lead to greater volatility in migration and smuggler services.
Since both equations (10) and (11) depend on  (s) ; the equilibrium levels of migration, ; and quantity
of smuggler services, q; will depend on which state of nature, s = ; ; prevails. Without loss of generality,
we henceforth assume that  () >  () : To understand the impact that a change in the real value of
money will have, we examine the relative positions of equations (10) and (11) as depicted in Figures 1 and
2 for the two states of nature. Di¤erentiating equation (10) with respect to goods price of money, ; yields
dq /dp < 0, and thus, equation (10) has the conguration denoted in Figure 3 for the respective states of
nature s = ; : Similarly, di¤erentiating equation (11) yields
dq
d
=
T 0a
!L  Mee
Mq
:
The impact of an increase in the goods price of money depends on when
T 0a  !LMee T 0: (12)
Although equation (12) contains many distinct possibilities, we explore only one here.35 Let ( () ; q ())
and ( () ; q ()) denote values of  and q associated with state  and  respectively.
35The other possible cases (for example equation (12) could shift left or right or could be atter or steeper) are similar, in
terms of the methodology for understanding the impact on equilibria and hence are omitted.
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Case 1 Suppose that for every pair (; q) satisfying 0    1 and 0  q and equation (11) that either
T 0a  !LMee > 0 for all 
or
T 0a  !LMee < 0 for all :
Figure 3 depicts the two possible situations when either dq

d > 0 or
dq
d < 0:When
dq
d > 0 prevails, then
at the high-migration equilibria, an increase in  (s) increases the quantity of migration (lowers ) and the
impact on the quantity of smuggler services, q; is ambiguous (depending on whether equation (10) or (11)
shifts more). At the low-migration equilibria, an increase in  decreases both the quantity of migration and
smuggler services. When dq

d < 0; then an increase in  (s) has an ambiguous impact on migration in both
equilibria. The quantity of smuggler services decreases in the high-migration equilibria and is ambiguous in
the low-migration equilibria.
Remark: Although the impact of changes to the goods price of money are not necessarily clear or consis-
tent across the di¤erent possible cases, the intuition as to why the results are sometimes ambiguous and
asymmetric with respect to the high- and low-migration equilibria is straightforward. The two key factors
driving our results are a) the non-linear (and opposing) nature of both T () andM (q; e) and b) the fact that
enforcement funding equals the residual tax income obtained after paying for migrant services. As equation
(7) makes clear, the level of enforcement varies with the level of migration. Thus a change in the goods price
of taxes and transfers will have di¤erent impacts on enforcement depending on the initial level of migration.
In addition, given the non-linear nature of T () ; the marginal impact of changes to  (s) are likely to be
even more pronounced for di¤erent initial levels of migration. Thus, the marginal benet of an increase in
transfer payments will depend crucially on the current level of migration. Obviously, this marginal benet
can vary signicantly depending on whether the high or low-migration equilibria prevail.
This benet must be weighed against the costs of an increased goods value of tax revenue namely greater
funds available for enforcement. Greater enforcement increases the time spent crossing the border; thus
e¤ectively decreasing the wage income from migrating. Given the non-linear nature ofM (q; e) ; the marginal
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impact of a change in enforcement will di¤er (potentially signicantly) depending on which equilibrium
prevailed prior to the change in the goods price of money. Thus, the impact of a change in  (s) on the
high/low-migration equilibria depends entirely on the relative curvatures of the function T () and M (q; e) :
Most importantly however, when examining Figure 3 it becomes obvious that only in vary rare cases
will either the level of migration or the quantity of smuggler services (but neither both) be unchanged
when comparing high (low) migration equilibria across the two states of nature. Thus the introduction of
sunspots into the model economy will a¤ect the volatility of both migration ows and quantity of smuggler
services.36 The source of this volatility is described above: namely the marginal trade-o¤ which occurs
between additional enforcement and migrant services associate with di¤erent goods prices of taxes and
transfers. Finally, it is also worth noting that in the case where there exists a unique equilibrium for a given
state of nature (i.e., when equations (10) and (11) intersect only once for 0    1 and 0  q and s =  or
) then volatility arises only as a result of the sunspot and not from a lack of a coordinating mechanism.
5 Comparative Statics: Taxes
Although the government in this model simply collects taxes to make transfers and enforce the borders,
changes in either the taxes collected or the transfers made has an impact on the equilibria because both
indirectly impact the funds available to enforce the border. However, as one would expect the impact of
changes in taxes or transfers will largely depend on which equilibrium prevails.
Consider the e¤ect of a change in taxes (on either the skilled or unskilled). Di¤erentiating equation (10)
yields the following expression:
dq
d
= e
(1  )

B f  (1  d)g < 0:
Note that an increase in taxes has qualitatively the same e¤ect as an increase in the commodity price of
money. Di¤erentiate equation (11) one obtains
dq
d
=
 Mee
Mq
> 0:
36 In the analytical framework we have, it is not possible to determine the size of this impact on volatility without specifying
simple functional forms for many variables and simulating results on a computer.
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Figure 4 depicts the impact of an increase in taxes on the equilibria, for a given state of nature. There are
qualitative di¤erences depending on which equilibria we study. At low-migration equilibrium, an increase in
 , for example, results in a reduction in smuggling services and a decrease in migration. Conversely, when
evaluated at the high-migration equilibrium, an increase in taxes results in an increase in migration while
the e¤ect on the quantity of smuggling services is ambiguous.
It is not so unusual for the comparative static responses to di¤er. We o¤er some intuition to account for
why these di¤erences arise. The common thread between the two equilibria is simple; an increase in taxes,
for example, increases the level of border enforcement. Other things being equal, the increase in border
patrol induces less migration. We see this mechanism operating in the comparative statics evaluated at the
low-migration equilibrium; workers respond to the reduced incentive to migrate, spend more time in the
home country, and purchase fewer smuggling services.
The general equilibrium e¤ects are more pronounced in the high-migration equilibrium. In particular,
the migrant workers endogenous response can reduce the level of border enforcement. By increasing the
amount of time spent in the host country, migrant workers receive a larger transfer payment. From Part (a)
in Lemma (1), border enforcement is inversely related to workers time spent in host country. Thus, migrant
workers have an incentive to increase the level of migration. Indeed, this incentive to increase migration is
the dominant force operating in our analysis of the tax e¤ect evaluated at the high-migration equilibrium.
Along with the increased incentive to migrate, there is additional incentive to purchase smuggling services.
Our results indicate that we cannot infer which of the two countervailing e¤ects dominate. Hence, the total
e¤ect on equilibrium quantity of smuggling services is ambiguous when evaluated at the high-migration
equilibrium.37
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine a two-country model with one-way migration. The destination country uses an
interdiction policy  a border patrol  to inhibit this movement. We interpret such cross-country migration
37Essentially, Part (c) versus Part (a) in Lemma (3).
Note that the same intuition applies if we consider an increase in marginal rate of nominal transfer payments, a. For the sake
of saving space, we omit the analysis in the paper. We make this result available upon request.
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as illegal immigration. Further, we introduce smuggling services into the model economy to provide a market
solution that assists migrant workers in their e¤orts to circumvent the border patrol.
In general, changes in illegal immigration ows are relate to a number of di¤erent factors. For instance,
changes in wage di¤erentials are predicted to induce a greater ow of illegal immigrants. From a purely
micro perspective, a potential illegal immigrant is unlikely to have any market power and will be a wage-
taker in deciding where to work. In general equilibrium, the wage di¤erential and ow of illegal immigrants
are simultaneously determined so that focusing just on wage di¤erentials as the cause of illegal immigration
begs for answers to another set of questions.
An alternative approach is to propose a set of frictions that a¤ect the equilibrium ow of illegal immi-
grants. A number of papers propose network externalities as an explanation for illegal immigration ows.
Basically, building networks of illegal immigrants living abroad will reduce the cost of crossing a border when
governments increase e¤orts to reduce the ow of illegal immigrants. In addition, networks generate a host
of other cost-saving mechanisms that assist the immigrant.
In this paper, we o¤er an alternative explanation to account for changes in the ow of illegal immigrants.
Our model economy shuts down the wage di¤erential and network explanations, not because those explana-
tions do not have merit, but rather, we shut down those features so as to isolate alternative, realistic sources
of endogenous volatility. In particular, we identify conditions in which there are multiple equilibria. Ac-
cordingly, the absence of any coordinating mechanism means that it is possible for the equilibrium quantity
of illegal immigrants to switch back-and-forth between the two equilibria. In addition, we propose extrinsic
uncertainty sunspots to account for volatility in the ow of illegal immigrants. In our setup, we derive
conditions under which the presence of sunspots results in equilibria that are not mere randomizations over
the certainty equilibria. The importance of these ndings is that endogenous uctuations can account for
volatility in illegal immigration ows in the face of constant wage di¤erentials. Consequently, our results
o¤er an alternative to the network externality hypothesis.
Another advantage to our approach is that we introduce the sunspot as impacting the value of transfer
payments (or services) o¤ered to illegal immigrants and the intensity of border enforcement. Thus, unlike
the network externality approach, our approach develops a direct link between policy variables and the
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volatility in illegal immigration. Both transfer payments and border patrol are frequently discussed when
policy makers debate e¤orts aimed at deterring illegal immigration. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper
in which these policy variables play a central role in a¤ecting the uctuations.
A second key contribution is that in contrast to other theoretical models, we consider a case in which
there are two (multiple) equilibria. Because we are essentially dealing with a static decision problem, the
two equilibria add another layer of endogenous uctuations to the layer already associated with the sunspot.
In other words, the model economy shows that one source of endogenous uctuation owes to the existence of
the sunspot while another contributing factor is the equilibria  the high-migration or the low-migration 
on which migrant workers coordinate. We do not address the coordination issue in this paper as it pertains
to the equilibrium selection mechanism, but simply point out that an added degree of endogenous volatility
could be contributing to volatility observed in the illegal immigration data.
There is much room for further research in this model. One issue that deserves attention is to formulate
this model with physical capital so that dynamics could be formally developed and the implications studied.
This may provide one avenue to resolving the lack of a coordinating mechanism which is generating some
of the volatility in our model. Additionally, allowing the migrants and smugglers to be born prior to
the realization of the sunspot, but restricting them from participating in state-contingent markets due to
geographical limitations, is likely to have interesting implications. In particular, one could conjecture that
both migrants and smugglers would attempt to self-unsure by means of their choice of time spent working
at home and time spent accumulation capital respectively. This would likely eliminate volatility in migrant
ows and smuggler services and result in volatility resulting only from coordination problems.
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